Th e Principle of Complementarity
In 1998, at the negotiations of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, a principle was adopted which sets the background to the creation of the Iraq High Tribunal ("IHT"). Th e principle of complementarity recognized the sovereignty of nations and their preeminent responsibility to prosecute alleged off ences within their jurisdiction.
2 Th e principle of complementarity countered any suggestion that the responsibility for addressing international off ences was exclusively held by some external agency, be it the United Nations, the Security Council, the International Criminal Court or whomever. Th e fi rst responsibility of any state was to prosecute serious criminal off ences themselves.
When considering the question of the appropriate venue and the appropriate legal framework to deal with alleged crimes committed by members of the former Ba'athist regime in Iraq, it is important to keep in mind that if Iraq had been a member of the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), its fi rst duty would have been to attempt to deal with such off ences itself. 3 Only if the Iraq system had shown 1) In January 2001, he took up position with the United Nations as Prosecutor of Serious Crimes in East Timor, before returning to independent practice and pursuing a mixed practice of national and international criminal law. He has worked for agencies such as UNICEF and the International Bar Association, and on projects funded by the United Kingdom, Australian and Swedish governments.
2) Article 17 of the Rome Statute for the ICC on Issues of admissibility reads as follows:
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) Th e case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) Th e case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; 3) Of course, in respect of the alleged crimes of the Ba'athist regime these were outside the temporal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court as they predated July 2002. However, the principle remains the same. itself unable or unwilling to tackle such prosecutions, would the ICC have had jurisdiction to take over. If that is the situation for a member state of the ICC, then so it must be for a non-member.
In addition, when considering the appropriate venue for an Iraq tribunal, no doubt the experience of the international tribunals would have been considered. Unfortunately the experience has not been a very happy one. Th e tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), for Rwanda (ICTR), for Cambodia (ECCC) and for East Timor (Special Panels in Dili), have all been repeatedly criticized by international observers. Th ey have variously proved to be expensive, 4 slow, 5 diffi cult to agree upon with the national jurisdictions, 6 and hampered by a lack of political will. 7 Th ere is a strong argument to be made that a country which has just emerged from a period of dictatorship is not a proper place to hold trials, which inevitably focus upon the divisions which the dictatorship caused. A charge of crimes against humanity has at its heart an off ence committed against the wider civilian population, and against the conscience of humanity. Trials staged after the fall of a regime will invariably be conducted by the parts of society which emerge, released, from the oppression of the former regime. Th is will most often mean that those who perform the state-appointed functions of prosecution and judiciary will come from the previously oppressed group. In that context, is it possible for those who preside over such trials not to be one of the victims; not only because they are part of humanity, but because they are inevitably drawn from the society which was oppressed? Th is argument, however persuasive it may be, has been lost to the principle of complementarity. Could it ever be possible to fi nd a judiciary which is wholly independent of the crimes, from within the country's own citizens? And, if it was not, would this be a legitimate objection to a national tribunal? If it is, then what does complementarity mean in practice and why have internationalized courts such as in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia, used national judges along side their international colleagues?
Th e Iraq Model
Th e Iraq High Tribunal was diff erent from previous models for the prosecution of crimes against humanity and genocide. Since the early 1990s, a number of
